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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin  Abstract 
The relevance of sociological theory for explaining the recent dramatic changes in 
Eastern Europe is at hand. The impact of the downfall of communism has been 
compared with those "Great Transformations" along which sociology evolved as a 
"science of crisis par excellence" (Habermas). The actual elaboration of a 
sociological theory of post-communist transformation and its relation to East 
European studies is, nevertheless, anything but clear. The unexpected collapse of 
socialism was perceived as a failure of prognosis and led to self-critical debates in 
all social science disciplines. In this rethinking its basic concepts, sociology is 
exposed to pressure from different sides - above all from the polemic launched 
with the surprising revival of the theory of totalitarianism against the ,,liberalist 
social sciences" across the board. Influential historians like Robert Pipes, Martin 
Malia, Robert Conquest, and Francois Furet followed by sociologists from Robert 
Nisbet to Seymour Lipset hold the fatal influence exerted by social science 
concepts on Eastern European and Soviet Studies during the last decades 
responsible for the "whole intellectual disaster in Western Academe" which 
became apparent after 1989. These approaches, as the neo-totalitarian accusation 
runs, elevated Soviet socialism to a modernization strategy and conceded a reform 
capacity which, in fact, was not available. Target of this critique are all attempts 
of a social history "from below", sociological theories of action and especially 
"the positivist illusion of modernization theory". Blinded by political motives, it is 
said, the insights of (neo-)totalitarianism theory into the inevitable collapse of 
communism were dismissed. 
In order to correctly draw the lines in the controversies between neo-
totalitarianism theory and the "social science approach", it is helpful to follow 
them along the changing career of the concept of totalitarianism thereby 
reconstructing the sociological arguments involved in the current discussion on 
the disintegration of socialist societies. On this line it will be argued (section 2), 
that the crisis of the classic theory of totalitarianism and the "social science 
approach" in Soviet studies did not follow from a politically motivated 
"revisionism" since the 1960s and 1970s. Analysing the socialist societies after 
1945 was shaped from the very beginning by sociological, political science and 
economic models, which contrasted with fundamental assumptions of the classic 
concept of totalitarianism (section 3). The findings generated by this type of 
research as well as its limits are revealed when it comes to explaining the 
disintegration of Soviet socialism. The neo-totalitarianist's objection is correct that ranging socialism in an evolutionary scheme of ascending forms of society 
was problematic. This construction seems highly inadequate in view of the post-
communist crises and regressions (section 4). On the other hand, a coherent and 
self-reliant neo-totalitarianism theory is not visible (section 5). Instead the 
research on Eastern Europe after 1989 has seen an explosive growth of the "social 
science approach" in the course of which many "revisionist" theorems have been 
refuted, modified or confirmed. 
Nevertheless, the wave of social science theories entering the post-communist 
studies does not imply a way back to the golden age of classic modernization 
theory. The lesson to be learned from (neo-)totalitarianism theory concerns the 
stress it lays on domination and its specific irrationalities, variables which were 
indeed neglected by mainstream sociology and, after the Soviet breakdown, are 
ignored by the liberalist optimism of neoclassic reform programmes. The drama 
of the post-communist crises reminds us that there are no hidden hands and no 
evolutionary universals which would lead, quasi automatically, to "modernity". 
On the other hand, the lesson to be learned from the "social science approach" is 
that even the "most total totalitarianism" did not result from a "logic" of history, 
but from certain constellations of interests, reciprocities between rulers and ruled, 
institutions of administration and value commitments, etc. which are quite 
accessible to a reconstruction in sociological terms. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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1. From the Downfall of Socialism to the Crisis of Social Science Theory 
The importance of sociological theory for explaining the recent dramatic changes 
in Eastern Europe is obvious. The breakdown of Soviet Socialism marks the most 
drastic turning-point in the history of post-war Europe - the dismissal of a form of 
society which for a long time was considered a competing alternative to 
democratic capitalism even by non-Marxist Western social scientists.
1 The impact 
of the downfall of communism has been compared with those "Great 
Transformations" along which sociology evolved as a "science of crisis par 
excellence"
2: On the agenda are the constitution of democratic institutions, the 
development of market-regulated economies, and new forms of social integration. 
If certain dilemmas are raised by simultaneous democratization, economic 
liberalization, and social restructuring, then these dilemmas have accompanied 
sociology since its existence. In contrast to political science and positive 
economics which swiftly developed into specialized disciplines, sociological 
theory has always kept societies as wholes in its view. As long as the Eastern 
European crises are centered on the transition to a new principle of social 
organization, a theory seems required which according to Talcott Parsons "treats 
the most comprehensive unit ordinarily studied by sociologists, the total society."
3 
In other words, the radical change in Eastern Europe belongs to those extra-
ordinary events from which far-reaching implications can be expected for society, 
as well as for social science theory. 
The actual elaboration of a sociological theory of post-communist transformation 
and its relation to East European studies is, nevertheless, anything but clear. The 
unexpected collapse of socialism was perceived as a failure of prognosis, as the 
"Black Friday" of social science.
4 The following (self-) criticism of the defaults of 
social science has, no doubt, manifested indisputable weaknesses. It holds true 
that political analyses of the socialist regimes presupposed the stability of their 
research object and have underestimated the fragility of communist rule over 
Eastern Europe. Western economic science systematically exaggerated the 
capacity of planned economies well into the 1980s. Many sociological theorems 
were tailored for the crises phenomena and integration problems of Western 
societies: they did not see that socialism was exposed to much graver "problems 
  1   An unambiguously competing form of modernization" as Almond 1968, 332, wrote. 
2  Habermas 1981, 19-20. 
3  Parsons 1966, 1. 
4  v. Beyme 1994, 35. Cf. Malia 1990, 297: "Certainly Western Sovietology, so assiduously 
fostered over the past four decades, has done nothing to prepare us for the surprises of the past 
four years." 
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of legitimization" than "late capitalism".
5 Therefore, social science and research 
on Eastern Europe are under a phase of reconstruction with good reason.
6 
In this process of rethinking its basic concepts, sociology is exposed to pressure 
from different sides - above all from the polemic launched with the surprising 
revival of the theory of totalitarianism against the liberalist social sciences across 
the board.
7 This polemic is based on the twofold thesis that neither the communist 
seizure of power in 1917 nor Gorbachev's reform attempts since the mid-1980s 
are to be understood as "social revolutions"
8, but as a coup d'etat by a small elite 
who forced a system upon Russian society which was, in the end, incapable of 
further development. The issue at stake concerns four controversial questions 
which the research on Eastern Europe allegedly has failed to clarify: The 
retrospective assessment of Soviet socialism as a form of domination, the 
dynamics of the socialist system, the reasons for the Soviet collapse, and the 
prospects for the post-communist societies. Influential historians like Robert 
Pipes, Martin Malia, Robert Conquest, and Francois Furet held the fatal influence 
exerted by social science concepts on Eastern European and Soviet Studies during 
the last decades, responsible for the "whole intellectual disaster in Western 
Academe" which became apparent after 1989.
9 These approaches, as the neo-
totalitarian accusation runs, elevated Soviet socialism to a modernization strategy 
and conceded a reform capacity which, in fact, was not available.
10 This kind of 
critique was directed against all attempts of social history "from below", 
sociological theories of action and especially "the positivist illusion of 
modernization theory".
11 The USSR was 
5  As Tiryakian 1995, 250, notes. 
6  Rutland 1993, 122; cf. Armstrong, 1993; Bergson 1995; Breslauer 1992; Burawoy 1992; De 
Spiegeleire  1995; Meyer  1991  and  1994; Motyl  1990 and  1992; Orlovsky (ed.)  1995; 
Remington 1992; Schroeder 1995; Tucker 1992; Walker 1993. 
7  Malia 1993, 86; Pipes 1993, 75. A similarly encompassing consolidation of "practically all the 
humanities" is suggested by Conquest 1993, 91-98, here 97. 
8  The target of this criticism was the concept of "social revolution" as defined by Skocpol 1994, 
5, "as rapid, basic transformation of a society's state and class structures, accompanied and in 
part accomplished through popular revolts from below", and applied in a comparative analysis 
of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions (Skocpol 1976). Cf. for an application of this 
concept to the Russian revolutions Mann 1993, 660-666. "Social revolutions" are interpreted 
by 
Mann as reaction to dilemmas resulting from the incorporation into international processes of 
modernization - a dimension which, for obvious reasons, is missing in the concept of "closed 
societies". 
9  Conquest 1993, 97. 
10  Even the CIA relied on the methodology developed by Abram Bergson for its estimates: "The 
CIA was simply applying the best scientific techniques and concepts of measurement 
developed 
by academic sovietology, which on the whole had a tendency towards the left" (Malia 1992, 
60). 
11  Malia 1995, 126;. cf. Pipes 1993, 68-69. The neo-totalitarian attack aims especially at the 
methods of the Annales School and the socio-historical interpretations of 1917 as proposed e.g. 
by Suny 1983 and mentioned above. With Furet, a prominent social historian of the Annales 
Group, has changed sides to neo-totalitarism theory. For a reply to Pipes by a social historian 
see Suny 1994. I will return to a discussion of the considerable differences between classic 
totalitarianism theory and its neo-totalitarian revival in section 5. 
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thougthlessly considered "a society like every other".
12 The insights of (neo-) 
totalitarianism theory into its inevitable collapse were dismissed. 
The renaissance of totalitarianism theory is no eccentricity of neo-conservative 
historians. Conservative sociologists like Robert Nisbet stress the enduring 
relevance of Hannah Arendt.
13 Liberal theorists like György Bence and Seymour 
Lipset consider the contributions made by social science to Soviet studies "a well-
informed error", against which they contrast the heuristics of the totalitarianism 
model: "Although much maligned by Sovietologists in the 1970s and 1980s, it has 
proven to be the most fruitful of the paradigms."
14 Ironically, the concept of 
totalitarianism, opportunistically dropped by Western theorists in the wake of 
detente, gained an unexpected topicality in the self-definition of the post-
communist societies and in the vocabulary of reform politicians - as a recognition 
of a lacking civil society.
15 After the samizdat publication of Arendt's Origins of 
Totalitarianism  had already unfolded its effects on Eastern Europe, and the 
translation of Conquest's The Great Terror was circulated as the first treatise on 
Stalin's system of terror in Russian in 1972, the more recent works of Pipes and 
Malia became public events in Moscow's political life. Now even the Russian 
leadership recognizes the historical period between 1917 and 1987 as one of 
"totalitarianism"
16 - after, as Malia claims, his famous article published under the 
pseudonym "Z" in 1990 was distributed among the members of the Central 
Committee and sharpened their consciousness of crisis.
17 
Whatever impression the anti-sociological undertones of the recent controversies 
over an adequate perspective on the breakdown of Soviet socialism may make -
they represent a challenge both to sociological theory and to (post-)communist 
studies. In order to correctly draw the lines in the controversies between neo-
totalitarianism theory and the "social science approach", it is helpful to follow 
them along the changing career of the concept of totalitarianism. My aim is not so 
12  Furet 1995, 617. 
13  Nisbet 1992; for Nisbet's concept of totalitaranism, embedded in a conservative philosophy of 
history, see his 1983, 182-206. 
14  Bence & Lipset 1994, 181; though an excellent survey, Bence and Lipset, concerned almost 
exclusively with the failure to foresee the Soviet breakdown, deliberately omit the social 
historians' research on the long term dynamics of social change. Cf. for another critical survey 
Laqueur 1994, 96-130. 
15  On the spreading and use of totalitarianism theory in Eastern Europe after 1968 see Rupnik 
1984,43-71. 
"Russia in the 20th century lived through different periods - monarchism, totalitarianism, 
perestroika, democratic development. Each development possessed an ideology of its own. But 
now we have none. And that is bad" (Boris Jelzin, July, 7th, 1996, cited after Die Zeit, No. 33, 
August 8th 1996). Cf. Laquer 1994, 94: ,,almost everyone in Russia - even conservatives and 
old communists such as Yegor Ligachev - used the term, sometimes perhaps to sweepingly. 
Those who did not, really meant 'totalitarianism', when for some reasons they used another 
term." 
17   Malia 1994, ch. 12, fn. 14. 
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much a retrospective exercise in critique of ideology
18 as a reconstruction of the 
sociological arguments involved in the current discussion on the disintegration of 
socialist societies. 
In this sense, I would first like to show that the crisis of the classic theory of 
totalitarianism (section 2) and the "social science approach" in Soviet studies did 
not emerge due to a politically motivated "revisionism" since the 1960s and 
1970s. Analysing the socialist societies after 1945 was shaped from the very 
beginning by sociological, political science and economic models, which 
contrasted with fundamental assumptions of the classic concept of totalitarianism 
(section 3). The findings generated by this type of research as well as its limits are 
revealed when it comes to explaining the disintegration of Soviet socialism. The 
neo-totalitarianist's objection is correct that ranging socialism in an evolutionary 
scheme of ascending forms of society was problematic.
19 This construction seems 
highly inadequate in view of the post-communist crises and regressions (section 
4). On the other hand, a coherent and self-reliant neo-totalitarianism theory is not 
visible (section 5). 
2. Limits of the Classical Theory of Totalitarianism 
To sociologists, "totalitarianism" seemed for some time to be rather a topic in the 
history of the social sciences than a topical challenge to their own theory-building. 
Not quite without reason, because the subject and the concept opened a highly 
politicized terrain. The origins of the term reached back into the liberal, 
democratic and socialist criticism of Italian fascism, which adopted the term to 
characterize its own radicalism before the scope of the term was expanded in the 
1930s to cover both National Socialism and Stalinism.
20 Thus the classic theory of 
totalitarianism conceptualized an epoch trying to see the anti-liberal and anti-
democratic trend of the European dictatorships of the 20th century under the 
common denominator of a "totalitarian temptation" (Jean-Francois Revel). After 
the defeat of Italian fascism and German National Socialism, its domain was 
reduced to Stalinism, which at the end of World War II was upgraded to a world 
power. 
18  Cf. Chandler 1994, 8. 
19  Parsons 1971, ch. 7; Habermas 1981, II, 563-567, here 564, interprets "bureaucratic socialism" 
as a complementary, "post-liberal" development path to "organized capitalism", which "attains 
a similar autonomy towards the economic system due to mostly nationalized means of 
production and institutionalized one-party rule". Cf. Habermas 1973, 31, where the state- 
socialist societies, "considering their politically elitarian access to means of production", are 
classified as "post-capitalist". See a critique of this view by Arnason 1991, 181-213. 
20  On the genealogy of the concept in the writings of Luigi Sturzo, Luigi Salvatorelle, 
Giovanni 
Amendola, Lelio Basso and others see Peterson 1978. 
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At the height of its career in the 1950s, the concept of totalitarianism was adopted 
in the typology of state forms in order to classify a type of rule not subsumable 
under older forms of autocracy. Despite later differences totalitarianism theory 
and modernization research agreed on one point: in contrast to dictatorship, 
tyranny, and despotism, Soviet socialism was considered a specific modern form 
of government, unthinkable without advanced techniques of indoctrination, 
psychological manipulation and mass communication, unique in its combination 
of force, terror and mobilization. While autocracies and authoritarian regimes may 
allow a limited pluralism of social, economical, and political institutions, modern 
totalitarianism strives for a radical change of the social order and the creation of a 
new man. 
The well-known classic version of totalitarianism theory in form of a historico-
philosophical portrayal was presented by Hannah Arendt in 1951. Its 
generalization to an analytical ideal type was carried out by Carl J. Friedrich and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1956.
21 
Arendt's work was convincing, as it shed light on the techniques of an extremely 
centralized apparatus, which blocked any accountable delegation of power and 
subjected the competing parts of the apparatus to periodic purges. Totalitarian 
politics replaced political, national, and social traditions with a one-party 
dictatorship, opposed by atomised masses unable to act on their own, but ready to 
be mobilized at any time. Arendt's theory, which was to be applied to both 
Communism and Nazism, was hence not only theoretically relevant as a theory of 
domination, but of considerable sociological relevance as it assumed a tendency 
of totalitarianism to dissolve society and to remodel human nature. The concept of 
totalitarianism was intended to characterize a para-militaristically organized 
society, in which all civil activities, all intermediary institutions, even religious 
communities, relations between relatives and friends were replaced by 
organisations of the state. Considered as main variables, the policy and ideology 
were installed "from above", with the top-rank of the party and the secret police as 
decisive actors. 
This explains the (neo-)totalitarian aversion against interpretations of the Russian 
Revolution as a social movement "from below", i.e. a movement which was 
usurped by the Bolshevik leadership only after the revolution and during War 
Communism - when the Bolsheviks were trying to maintain power - by 
transforming the Soviets into state institutions and eliminating competing left 
wing parties as well as the internal opposition. In Pipes' and Malia's view, the 
"Russian Revolution" did not articulate the socio-economic contradictions of the 
late czarist industrialization but exploited the chaos caused by World War I. 
Therefore, it could not claim historical legitimacy. On the contrary, by seizing 
power the 
21  Arendt 1951; Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956. Useful comments on the hesitant reception of tota   
     litarianism theory brought by European emigrants into the USA are presented by Nisbet 1992. 
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Bolsheviks forced their Utopian project of a social and ideological transformation 
on Russian society regardless of any losses. After the violent dissolution of 
classes and nationalities and in the face of the elimination of all mediating powers, 
analyses of social structures, hypotheses of social change or interpretations of 
political aims hardly seemed to make sense any more. ,,The Communist Party (...) 
came to substitute both for the proletariat and for the logic of history; and this 
substitution furnished the basic institution of the Soviet system - the Party-state. 
But this entity was no ordinary or 'normal' state, an institution which even in its 
most authoritarian or despotic form remains in significant measure distinct from 
society. This was a total state that substituted for society."
22 Considering the 
uniqueness of totalitarian movements, the conventional categories of social 
science seemed to have lost their applicability. 
Despite these difficulties, Friedrich and Brzezinski proposed a definition of 
totalitarian rule which seemed more appropriate by scientific standards than 
Arendt's historico-philosophical explanation - a proposal, which at the same time 
was entangled in the notorious problem of seizing historical constellations with 
analytical definitions. 
According to the authors, totalitarian dictatorships were characterized by six 
features which were supposed to express their "basic similarity". By combining 
these six features into a kind of "totalitarian syndrome", the authors created an 
ideal-typical concept, thus comprising the following elements: (1) an official 
ideology directing which is to direct society to a final state of mankind, thereby 
legitimizing all violence and sacrifices as a realization of a higher form of 
democracy; (2) a hierarchically organized, dictatorially led party to which the 
state bureaucracy (and every institution) is subordinated; (3) a politically 
instructed police terror, directed against arbitrarily defined opponents, 
encompasses the entire population, as well as the party; (4) the state monopoly on 
information, news, and (5) weapons means a concentration of all of the means of 
domination in the hand of the party and the state so that finally (6) the economy 
becomes subordinated to bureaucratic co-ordination and central control. 
This ideal-type definition was very suitable for generalization, and subsequently, 
historical empires, pre-industrial as well as communist mobilizational regimes 
were classified as "totalitarian".
23 The Soviet Union, however, still remained the 
primary field of application. The theory of totalitarianism, in its different versions, 
advanced to the dominant Sovietological paradigm in the 1950s. Moreover, it 
gained a polarizing function in the context of anti-communism. The appreciation 
of the term mainly to be found with political scientists and historians, pointed 
beyond descriptive and analytical purposes: "totalitarianism" functioned as a 
22  Malial 1993. 
23  Moore 1958. 
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normative premise to start every exploration into totalitarian systems with an 
option for Western values of freedom.
24 
The main problem was not that a scientific theory was dependent on the political 
vicissitudes of the East-West-confrontation - its supporters were recruited from 
the right as well as from the left. More problematic was the fact that its 
availability for rather opposing purposes indicated that its denotation was vague 
and its explanatory value doubtful. Arendt had already differentiated the merely 
"authoritarian" Italian fascism from Stalinism and Nazism (while Friedrich, for 
example, considered all three regimes totalitarian). A point of debate remained 
whether subsuming Nazism and Soviet communism under one and the same 
category - even admitting all similarities in the techniques of domination -
concealed significant differences in ideological aims, economic systems and 
readiness to engage in a war of conquest.
25 Even when the concept after 1945 was 
applied primarily to the Soviet Union, it remained unclear, whether only the 
period of Stalin's rule or the complete history since 1917 should be characterized 
as "totalitarian".
26 
The stagnation of the approach could be seen from the ad hoc-adjustments, by 
which its framework of definitions was adapted to the changing realities of the 
post-Stalin era. The decrease in repression and the fact that ideology became 
increasingly routinized led to paradoxical conceptions such as "enlightened", 
"rationalized", "constitutional", or "welfare"-totalitarianism.
27 The methodological 
problem of this kind of concept formation was most evident in Friedrich's later 
writings in which the real types of Nazism and Stalinism which once stood in the 
24  As Motyl 1990, 83, writes: "the totalitarian 'model' provided solid moral ground on which to 
stand: all dictatorships were alike - be they Hitler's or Stalin's - and all deserved moral 
condemnation." Hannah Arendt (in her preface to the  1966 edition of her Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 478 fn.) did indeed notice the political functionalization of the theory of 
totalitarianism: "the cold war era has left us an official 'counter-ideology' (...), anti-
communism, 
which at the same time has the tendency of developing a claim to world domination and tempts 
us to follow an imagination; because it principally forbids us to distinguish the different 
communist one-party-dictatorships which exist in reality from a genuine totalitarian system". 
25  Cf. for diverging views within the totalitarian approach Aron 1965, ch. XV vs. Pipes 1994, ch. 
5, who advocates that Communism, Fascism and Nazism were essentially identical (and 
therefore argues against Arendt's emphasis on anti-semitism as a constitutive feature of 
"totalitarianism"). Instead, not only the revolutionary gesture but also the Nazis' anti-semitism 
is, in a highly dubious way, made understandable by the impression which the Bolsheviks' 
seizure of power made on Hitler: "Bolshevik outrages, and the open incitement to world 
revolution by a regime in which Jews were highly visible" (ibid. 256). 
26  Some authors argue that even Stalinism during the Great Purges should not be considered 
"totalitarian" but reconstructed along socio-historical lines; see Getty 1991; Fitzpatrick 1986 
and the contributions to Getty (ed.) 1993. For an action-theoretical approach to the most brutal 
project of Nazism, "eliminative antisemitism", see Goldhagen 1995, who consequently argues 
against totalitarianism theory. 
27  Fainsod 1968, 108; O'Brian 1977/78, 70-80. 
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centre of the approach, were suddenly reinterpreted as "rather extreme 
aberrations" from the ideal type of totalitarian dictatorship, hardly ever realized.
28 
And this was, at the same time, the crucial theoretical shortcoming: the 
classification of the East European societies in accordance with a typology of 
forms of domination and the definition of its "essential characteristics" did not 
constitute a theory of their socio-economic and political dynamics. Progress in 
exploring the "closed societies" was essentially made through qualifications by 
Western social science theories and a growing (self-) criticism of the adherents of 
the totalitarianism approach. The decisive factor for the diffusion of social science 
models into communist studies since the early 1950s were not the changed 
political conditions per se but undeniable explanatory weaknesses of the classic 
theory of totalitarianism. The assumed omnipotence of totalitarian rule let the 
political decisions appear as a direct result of centralist decisions, without paying 
attention to their implementation by competing apparatuses and without laying 
stress on the interaction between politics and society - a view which was 
increasingly implausible in the face of "de-Stalinization" and the newly accessible 
information on communist systems. Under these circumstances, the critical 
evaluation of classic totalitarianism theory did not reflect a politically motivated 
"revisionism", but a growth of empirical, theoretical and methodological 
knowledge. 
3. Soviet Studies and Social Science Theory 
The increasing use of social science theories in East European studies was, far 
from what recent polemics suggest, not the result of the late 1960s when the 
"radicals moved up to the teaching posts."
29 Sociological sophistication of East 
European studies was already asserted in 1953 at the first interdisciplinary 
conference dealing with the topic "totalitarianism", at which, along with the 
original proponents of the approach and along with Sovietologists like Merle 
Fainsod, social scientists like Harrold D. Lasswell, David Riesman and Karl W. 
Deutsch took part.
30 In fact, theories on Soviet-type societies after 1945 were 
based upon close co-operation between Soviet studies and sociology right from 
the beginning. Clyde Kluckhohn, the first director of the Harvard Russian 
28 Friedrich 1968, 34. Linz' (1975) much more elaborated three-dimensional classification,   
     according  to  which  totalitarian  and  authoritarian regimes differ in their respective degrees  
     of political pluralism (monism vs. limited pluralism), of ideological penetration (centrality   
          of ideology vs. authoritative mentality) and mobilization (mobilization vs.   
          depoliticization). Nevertheless, similar difficulties arise: "totalitarianism" is not based on   
          its "unique" quality but merely as an extremely pronounced "authoritarianism". The same   
          gradualistic softening of the original concept characterizes Sartori's (1993) vindication of   
     totalitarianism theory. 
29  Furet 1995, 616; cf. Conquest 1993, 97-98. 
30  Cf. Friedrich (ed.) 1954. 
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Research Center, welcomed Alex Inkeles' opening of the series published at his 
institute: "It is particularly appropriate that the first volume of the Russian 
Research Center Studies should be by a sociologist."
31 At the same time, Inkeles' 
Public Opinion in Soviet Russia opened the way to an analysis of Soviet society, 
which replaced the political rhetoric of the totalitarianism approach by the 
standards of empirical-analytical social science - a development which I would 
like to survey in three steps. 
(a) The distance which sociology and economic theory kept towards the concept 
of totalitarianism was due to methodological rather than political reasons. Since 
the 1950s already, the social sciences were orientated more closely to the 
postulate of a value-free science. The normativism of traditional political theories 
appeared to be suspicious. This also applied to the newly established Soviet 
studies: ,,The field of Soviet Studies is such that failure explicitly to condemn is 
viewed by some as tantamount to approval, and failure to praise is taken by others 
to be equivalent to criticism. Such misunderstanding may be avoided, or at least 
minimized, if the reader will keep in mind the distinction between a political and 
moral evaluation and a scientific judgement."
32 Accordingly, the appropriate 
concepts and methods were not designed for the "uniqueness" of the phenomenon 
under study, but were constructed in the context of generalized theories.
33 On the 
other hand, Soviet studies became relevant beyond their immediate domain, by 
being intended to verify general social theories in the Soviet case. The topics 
raised - e.g. mass communication - were no longer subsumed to a logic of 
domination, but became part of a programme to explore the concrete relationships 
between communicative, social, and political systems and the tensions implicated 
therein. The classic sociological theme of the role of ideas in social change was 
turned into the empirical question of how effective the dominant ideology may be 
in the real course of Soviet politics.
34 
The functional approach which became prominent in the following years, 
suggested to analyse "totalitarian systems", on the one hand with regard to their 
immanent conditions of stability and legitimization, on the other hand from the 
31  Kluckhohn in Inkeles 1951, p. xii. 
32  Inkeles 1951, xii. 
33  For Inkeles these were the theories on mass communication, social structure and social 
psychology developed during World War II by Lazarsfeld, Merton and Parsons. On social 
mobility see the important study of Inkeles  1950. Inkeles & Bauer 1959 presented an 
investigation into Soviet everyday-life, which pointed perfectly towards a social history 
from 
below which is so energically incriminated by Malia and his colleagues. The reproach of 
"social scientification" refers to the growing impact which the "Behavioural Revolution" 
had on 
the communist studies during the 1960s, recognizable e.g. in the contributions to Fleron 
(ed.) 
1969 or Kanet 1971. 
34  E.g. the programme of the important monography by Moore in 1950, which appeared as 
vol. 2 
of the Russian Research Center Studies edited at Harvard University. Cf. the instructive 
preface 
of Kluckhohn on the methodological design of the Soviet studies and its relation to social 
theory: "(...) not bounded by arbitrary disciplinary lines (...) more than an approximation to 
a 
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comparative perspective on functionally equivalent solutions for general 
problems of development in backward societies. 
The economic theory of growth in the 1950s and 1960s was more interested in 
the amazing rates of growth and investment of planned economies than in their 
"totalitarian" structures of administration. Impressed by increasing GNPs, 
political science eventually replaced its descriptive typologies of rule in favour 
of a functionalist perspective of the Soviet regime, which now appeared as one 
of several "mobilizing systems": "Successful models now include Japan and 
the Soviet Union."
35 Approaches of this kind were not primarily interested in 
historical singularities, but rather in varieties of modernization and 
corresponding types of stress and crises.
36 The neutrally sounding formulas of 
"social change" and "modernization" were aimed at phenomena which 
contradicted the theoretical assumptions of totalitarianism: the potential of the 
communist regimes to change. The keywords of "convergence" and 
"evolution" assumed the existence of general development imperatives on 
advancing "industrial societies".
37 
The hypothesis of convergence suggested the application of modern social 
science theories to the origins, dynamics, and lines of conflict inside the 
Eastern European societies. In this sense, few sociologists have doubted that 
Soviet-type regimes were modernizing societies. The so-called "socialist 
primitive accumulation", as is well-known, was an attempt - and not the first 
one in Russian history - to catch up with Western European industrialization 
for which especially the Prussian "industrialization from above" served as a 
model.
38 During the course of the enforced Soviet industrialization, numerous 
indicators commonly applied to modernization processes were fulfilled: de-
traditionalization by force; relatively high rates of growth and investment; 
urbanization and mobility never fully controlled; a high degree of 
alphabetization, and elements of welfare-state integration. To speak in the 
words of Walt Rostow's Non Communist Manifesto of 1960: ,,In its broad 
shape and timing, then there is nothing about the Russian sequence of 
preconditions, take-off, and drive to technological maturity that does not fall 
within the general pattern; although like all other national stories it has unique 
features."
39 
35  Apter 1965, vii; cf. 392: "Each of these systems handles modernization differently, even 
though, in practice, their activities may appear similar." For Apter's arguments against 
totalitarianism theory see ibid., 244-45, fn. 21. 
36  Even if this would mean that Nazism and Soviet communism were not "essentially different" 
from  the  Western pattern  of modernization  but distortions,  exaggerations  and  uneven 
developments of the pattern itself (Parsons 1942). In Parsons' analyses of the fascist movements 
in Germany and Japan the concept of totalitarianism, therefore, played no role. 
37  See esp. Sorokin 1960 and Tinbergen 1961, 333-341. 
38  It should be remembered that Stalin's "revolution from above" was not an "Asian programme", 
but did emulate Prussia's attempt to catch up with England's lead in industrialization without 
risking the democratization of the French Revolution. On the Prussian model of a "revolution 
from above" as opposed to the French Revolution see Bendix 1978, 407 pp. and 422; on 
Stalin's adaption of this conception see Moore 1950, 231. 
39  Rostow 1960, 67. 
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Indeed, Rostow's Dynamics of Soviet Society (1953) may be regarded as the first 
analysis of the Soviet Union in terms of modernization theory - a study which 
differentiated consistently between the economic, political, social, and cultural 
spheres of the Soviet system. This was an analytical perspective which 
corresponded to Parsons' contemporary formulation in The Social System (1951). 
Rostow attributed the peculiarities of the Russian traditions of rule to Lenin's 
voluntarist revision of Marx's theory into a strategy of seizing power, which at the 
same time was legitimized in objectivist terms by its alleged insight into the 
necessary course of history.
40 The intention to transform society by unconditional 
use of force was, however, refracted on the factual modalities of the exertion of 
power: on diverging interests between and within the bureaucratic apparatuses of 
the army, the party, the secret police, and the administration, on the relevant 
groups of society alienated by the use of excessive force, on the contradiction 
between political arbitrariness and technocratic efficiency. 
Considering the precarious balance of integrative and disintegrative tendencies, 
Rostow was less interested in the perfection than in the limits of totalitarian rule 
in a "moving society", in which political, social, economic, and cultural factors 
played together in a way which evaded even the most vigorous political measures. 
The institutional structure and political process of the Soviet Union seemed to be 
less the result of conscious long-term planning than of uncontrollable 
consequences of a policy confronted with internal restrictions posed by society, 
situative conditions, self-produced problems and necessary adaptations to the 
international constellation.
41 Therefore, Rostow derived the postulate for an 
interdisciplinary approach to explain the motivation of the Russian leadership, the 
potential of resistance within Russian society as well as alternative paths of future 
development - not without (as regards e.g. the self-interest of the bureaucracy) 
contributing to the knowledge of Western societies as well. 
(b) Rostow's programme was implemented by that branch of East European 
studies oriented to the modernization paradigm, which since the early 1960s had 
replaced the idea of a strictly totalitarian system by more sophisticated analyses. 
These were the first to recognize the far-reaching impact of the reforms initiated 
by Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. The results of this research are not 
only of historical interest. They demonstrated a very productive exchange 
between sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Alex Inkeles, 
Gerhard Lenski, Barrington Moore, and the advanced communist studies. 
Furthermore, the results of these studies could have been an ideal preparation for 
the unexpected course of the post-communist reforms - a point to which I will 
return later. 
40  Rostow 1953, 84-97. 
41  An assessment which is impressively vindicated by the now accessible Politburo protocols 
1919-1940; see David-Fox & Hoffmann 1996, 99-103. 
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In spite of the variety of approaches
42, the modernization approach to communist 
studies followed a common perspective, which differed clearly from the classic 
model of totalitarianism. 
Despite all the deformations, Soviet socialism appeared as a strategy of 
modernization,  i.e. a form of-rule, which did not merely amount to its own 
totalization, but pursued, however corrupted, goals of development.
43 Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Inkeles and Moore interpreted numerous 
phenomena as consequences of rapid industrialization, which - largely 
independently of the ideological declarations of its originators - forced a drastic 
change upon Russian society: ,,Important as the commitment to socialism was, by 
itself it was not the most important element. Among many Bolsheviks there was a 
commitment to the means of getting there: speedy industrial growth under 
centralized control. (...) It was the speed that carried with it the commitment to 
coercion."
44 This could at least raise the hope that tendencies towards 
democratization would sooner or later follow successful industrialization.
45 
The functional analysis, in contrast to a mere description of existing institutions, 
could detect a considerable change of political processes within the institutional 
conservatism of Soviet society. It validated the relationship between the political 
programme, the dynamics of social change and economic imperatives, as pointed 
out by Rostow. Richard Löwenthal observed the secularization of Utopian goals 
into a programme of development. The relation between the political system and 
social development had reversed itself within a persisting authoritarian 
framework: The political leadership which had forced development upon a 
backward society was confronted by the rising pressure of social differentiation 
and demands for participation.
46 
Under the impression of such changes, even Brzezinski dissociated himself from 
the classic conception of totalitarianism; he reduced its validity to the high-time of 
Stalinism. While the ideologically-guided transformation of society in the 1930s -
which received considerable support from the younger generations and the urban 
42     Surveys of the theoretical perspectives which became increasingly pluralized since the late  
       1950s, are given by Bell 1958; Laqueur 1983, 13-21, and esp. Almond & Roselle 1989. 
43     On this question Fainsod's grand material study (Fainsod 1953) already dissented from    
       Arendt's historico-philosophical outline; cf. Arendt 1966, 486, fn. 23. 
44      Moore 1987, 50. Accordingly, not only the emancipatory ambitions of Marxism, but also the 
       socialist value of equality were sacrificed to the primacy of industrialization- see ibid., 53; cf. 
       on this line Suny 1993, 157-58.     
45     In reference to this literature, Parsons formulated his well-known prognosis that the Eastern     
       pattern of modernization would develop towards a multi-party system (Parsons 1971, 127; cf.    
       below, fn. 69). 
46   Löwenthal 1970, 112; cf. Fainsod 1968, 110: "(...) some redefinition of influence within 
society appeared inevitable". By referring to these social differentiations and to a 
simultaneously growing self-awareness of the citizens, many authors later explained the 
politics of perestroika See e.g. Ruble 1987 and 1990; Lapidus 1989, Skilling 1990 and Starr 
1989. 
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proletariat - had altogether been suitable for industrial modernization, it now 
turned out to be no longer 'necessary' for running a "relatively developed 
industrial society", but on the whole "dysfunctional". Brzezinski did not interpret 
the conservative backlash against Khrushchev's reforms as a renewed totalitarian 
mobilization, but as "rather defensive measures against the self-assertion of 
society". The relationship between state and society would hence increasingly 
reflect the "traditional autocratic model and not the modern model of 
totalitarianism".
47 
The comparative perspective on the communist systems led to the application of 
categories developed in view of Western societies to the analysis of important 
details in Soviet-type systems. The theory of interest groups outlined by Gordon 
Skilling and others stressed the influence of weakly organized groups, factions 
and informal networks on the formulation and implementation of political 
themes.
48 It examined the competition within and between the party organizations, 
ministries, regions, etc., which by no means met the official dogma of the 
monolithic unity -due to parallel responsibilities, changing coalitions and 
diverging interests. Even within the strongly centralized hierarchy of the formal 
system, the political leadership remained dependent on reports, the 
implementation of their decisions by lower authorities, and regional and local co-
ordination. 
Referring to these insights to be expected from the general theory of bureaucracy, 
Jerry Hough specified Brzezinski's thesis of the "dysfunctionality" of 
totalitarianism by adding an important micro-sociological argument.
49 The 
effective exercising of power essentially depended on the position of that group, 
which actually controlled the means of production: in the "local organs", which 
represented the medium levels of the party in the districts, cities, and regions. The 
"Soviet prefects", who in the beginning were the executors of political repression 
and ideological indoctrination, were increasingly made responsible for the local 
translation and co-ordination of central directives. On the other side, the local 
levels of the party had to rely on co-operation by professional groups, specialists, 
and managers who in this way gained influence on policies. Increased attention for 
the functional elites of the Soviet system, from whom an interest in reforms and 
political liberalization could first be expected, seemed justified for comparative 
reasons alone. "In most areas of life the best way to predict the attitudes, values, 
and orientations of men in the Soviet Union is to draw from the general 
knowledge that we have about men holding comparable positions in Western
47   Brzezinski 1971, 266; cf. Brzezinski 1969, 20 and 25: "Today, (...) Soviet society is far more  
      developed and stable, far less malleable and atomized." 
48  Skilling 1966. It should be mentioned that the idea of a "limited pluralism" gained a critical   
     function during the Czechoslovakian experiment; see Rupnik 1984. 
49  Hough 1969 presented a theoretical and empirical analysis which Brzezinski (1971, fn. 31) - in  
     sharp contrast to the downgrading of Hough and the "Houghites" by Conquest - did know to  
     appreciate as "a very good argumentation". 
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industrial societies."
50 Analyses of the generational change, of the social and 
professional composition of political bodies became a prominent field of 
empirical research and should later play a role in interpreting the start of 
perestroika. 
Nevertheless, the "institutional pluralism" of Soviet society and the "responsive 
capacity" of policy remained overshadowed by the peculiarities of the system of 
domination. They were not based, as assumed in the classic model of pluralism, 
on free access to autonomous associations, but enabled organized groups to 
influence the political process through the channels of a system of institutions 
created by the state.
51 Additionally, they were a fertile ground for culturally 
shaped patron-client-networks, as described, among others, by T. H. Rigby, 
Zygmunt Bauman, and Lucian Pye. On the one side they reflected an informal 
system of status-differences and career paths; on the other side they produced 
functional substitutes for a judiciary system and for markets.
52 Privilege-seeking, 
the exchange of compliance and loyalty as well as highly personalized relations 
between functionaries and the public were to be understood from the background 
of a superimposition of charismatic, traditional, and modern attitudes; this 
demonstrated the effectiveness of pre-revolutionary traditions.
53 
The perseverance and functionalizing of the pre-revolutionary political culture, 
the competition between official culture and subcultural counter-currents, the 
after-effects of czarism or the dictatorships between the wars were examined in 
the research on political culture by Stephen White, George Schöpflin, and Gabriel 
Almond. Comparative political science pointed to essential differences of the 
structure and means of rule, the setting of goals, and the state of development 
inside the socialist world. Regarding the legitimization of socialist regimes, the 
appeal to particularistic bonds and the well-dosed employment of national 
traditions interacted with Western "values of modernization" (Löwenthal). George 
Breslauer saw the "welfare-state authoritarianism" legitimized by an implicit 
"social contract": the promise of social justice, equality and rising consumption 
was exchanged against conformity with the system.
54 
50  Inkeles 1968, 427. 
51  Hough 1977, 22-24, and Hough & Fainsod 1979, Ch. 10: The Institutional Actors. Cf. Brown 
1983, 61-107. Brzezinski 1966 spoke of an "elite pluralism" representing different group 
interests, which, channeled by bureaucratic bargaining, gained influence on the setting of the 
political agenda. On the thereby qualified role of the party see Lane 1985, 230-32. From a 
sociological point of view Shils had already characterized the compensatory role of this 
'pluralism':   "Incapacity  on  the  one  side,  evasiveness,  creativity  and  the  necessity  of 
improvisation on the other, introduce into totalitarian regimes, which would deny its validity, a 
good deal of pluralism (Shils 1956,  154). Even the often demonized "military-industrial 
complex" was divided into a multitude of bureaucracies, competing with each other and with 
the factions of the military for technological and strategic priorities (Almquist 1990). 
52  On clientelism see Eisenstadt & Roninger 1981, Jowitt's (1983) concept of neotraditional     
      corruption, an adaption of Weber's sociology of domination to the Soviet Union. Cf., also on a   
            Weberian line, Rigby's 1983 analysis of political legitimation in "mono-organisational   
      socialism". 
53  Hahn 1991. 
54  Breslauer 1978. 
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(c) These results were not only in contradiction with the theory of totalitarianism, 
but also with the ideology of the communist leadership. The ideal of a centrally 
controlled society and economy contrasted to the actual functioning of a system, 
which left- and required - wide leeway for decentral mechanisms. From a 
sociological point of view, it was to be expected that the formal constitution and 
the informal organisation of an overcentralized society would diverge. The most 
stringent examination of the competition and interaction between the formal and 
informal spheres in Soviet-type systems was, however, presented by Ed Hewett, 
an economist.
55 The "dead-weight" of vested interests of regions, ministries, 
enterprises, and functionaries was always conspicuous - which had been 
illustrated by the death of numerous reform attempts in the bureaucracies. The 
design, implementation and renegotiating of the five year plans usually lasted two 
years.
56 In a way, the bargaining mechanisms used were not a simple defect. They 
were functional at least as far as the information, motivation, and incentives, 
which were required for the central scheduling of plans or the implementation of 
central directives, could be gained only at the local level. 
The size of informal zones in Soviet society could be imagined from the estimated 
25% share of the shadow economy from the Soviet net material product. 
Quantitative estimates, however, did not capture the total extent and variety of 
informal activities. The typology of the "coloured markets" which was introduced 
by Katsenelinboigen and elaborated by Gordon Smith described the differences 
between legal, half-legal, and illegal financial sources and sales methods of goods 
in the Soviet Union very well.
57 That broad networks of pushers ("tolkachi") were 
tolerated, which in co-operation with local party functionaries had to compensate 
for the lack in horizontal integration between enterprises and branches, showed 
that the actual functioning of the Soviet economy was as far removed from the 
official self-representation as from Western reconstructions of the plan model. 
Even if some of the informal activities mentioned above may have performed a 
compensatorial function - they added up to a fatal outcome. Soviet-type societies 
were as intransparent for the supposedly well-informed leadership as for the 
official sciences. This precisely led to the specific problem, so aptly described by 
Tatyana Zaslavskaya, to which the reform-oriented social sciences in the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet studies in the West were confronted in a similar manner. 
"The formal economic mechanism is a skeleton, which is not a live organism. It is 
wrapped in live, concrete social relations, about which we know almost nothing 
nor have the evidence to identify them in our literature."
58 
55  Hewett 1988, esp. 96-100.; cf. on the political system Lane 1985, 197-203. 
56  Smith 1988, 195. For a background analysis see esp. Lewin 1973. 
57  Smith 1988, 216. 
58  Zaslavskaya 1987, 326. 
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What kind of literature might have been more capable of anticipating the 
dynamics of the reform attempts initiated in the 1980s and the subsequent 
disintegration of Soviet society? In the reform-oriented sociology associated with 
Zaslavskaya's "Novosibirsk School" which had direct influence on the early 
programme of perestroika, the insight into the futility of reform projects "from 
above" had prevailed for some time: "The structure of the national economy long 
ago crossed the threshold of complexity when it was still possible to regulate it 
effectively from a single center."
59 The results of her empirical research on the 
Soviet social structure, on the internal differentiation of the working class and 
intelligence, on regional and demographic problems, on conflicts inside the 
nomenclatura classes, etc., contrasted considerably with the official dogma of an 
increasingly unified society. Considering this research which was quite obviously 
inspired by modernization theory, and considering a more and more intense 
exchange with Western sovietologists on the perspectives of perestroika, an 
interesting convergence between Western and Eastern social science seemed at 
hand. 
4. Competing Explanations of the Soviet Breakdown 
If my survey is correct, the diffusion of social science theory into East European 
studies did not result from a politically motivated break with the theory of 
totalitarianism, but from the trend to interdisciplinarity since the 1950s. The 
approaches mentioned above differentiated the total field of research into new 
units and variables by pointing out the informal structures of communist policy, 
and the diffusion of power behind the "totalitarian facade" (which Merle Fainsod 
had observed in the first edition of his classic How Russia is Ruled
60). 
After the experience of the collapse of communist systems in 1989-91, the 
behavioural revolution in the Soviet studies of the 1960s and 1970s appears, 
nevertheless, in a light which may explain the revival of totalitarianism theory. 
Were the final reform attempts during the 1980s propelled by a universal 
"modernization imperative" towards a market economy and political democracy 
so that the Soviet Union could at last prove to be a "normal society" under 
adjustment pressures?
61 Or did the "misconceptions of Western Sovietology" and 
"the West's cult of Gorbachev" conceal the - evident - non-reformability of the 
"most total totalitarianism"?
62 
59  Zaslavskayal983,91. 
60  Fainsod 1953, 328. 
61  In this sense, see Fukuyama 1993. 
62  Malia 1992, 58-61. 
PAGE 22 KLAUS MUELLER 
In answering these questions, I will compare (a) the modernization approach and 
(b) the neo-totalitarian's explanatory sketch to clarify, in the following section, 
the decisive points of difference. 
(a) A (self-)critical retrospective view on Soviet studies cannot ignore the 
renewed objections to the transfer of Western categories. What matters, however, 
is learning the right lessons from the benefit of hindsight. 
Regarding the application of Western models of bureaucracy, domination, and 
democracy to East European realities, the losses in descriptive strength and 
explanatory power were well-known. Much of the deliberately provocative 
hypotheses remained speculative due to a lack of reliable data. The decision 
between competing approaches was often left to intuition. The vagueness in 
applying the concepts of group and pluralism to communist systems indicated the 
general problems of this procedure of "concept stretching".
63 Skilling was aware 
that the "groups" in Soviet politics did not possess the same solidity as their 
Western counterparts, but had to operate as loose networks of individuals due to 
lacking freedom of association and a simultaneous obligation to party discipline.
64 
"Institutional pluralism" was in fact an ideal type which, as Hough was only too 
aware, would provoke opposition and rejection.
65 
The comparative analysis of Soviet institutions was rejected because of the 
normative connotation of terms like "participation" and "influence" in a Western 
context. The hope of learning something about one's own society by analysing the 
Soviet Union, as expressed since Rostow, was understood as a scandalous 
equalization of incompatible systems. This reproach referred first of all to 
Hough's characterization of the Soviet system as a special kind of 
parliamentarianism in which the leadership was responsible towards the quasi-
parliamentarian Central Committee and the Politburo (which functioned as a 
quasi-cabinet).
66 These controversies, seldom led without political undertones, 
indicated how closely methodological questions within research on communism 
were implicitly or explicitly connected with valuations. 
The main objection, however, aimed at a theoretical problem which indeed could 
not be denied. Political science, economic, and sociological analyses of the Soviet 
system were less closely integrated than could be expected from Rostow's earlier 
interdisciplinary draft. Often enough they led to diverging results. The supposedly 
consolidated power of the political system during the immobile Brezhnev era 
63  Sartori 1970; LaPalombara 1975; Kerblay 1983, 264; Walker 1993, 234-238. 
64  For a self-critical retrospective see Skilling 1983 and Hough 1983. 
65  "No scientist believes that it accurately summarizes the situation in the Soviet Union today", as 
Hough 1977, 24, admitted. For a lucid assessment of the normative problems of Soviet studies 
see ibid., pp. 222-224. 
66  Hough & Fainsod 1979, 544. 
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contrasted with surprising social dynamics towards an urbanized society, towards 
higher degrees in education and rising expectations of participation. The 
economic output calculated from re-aggregated Soviet data again seemed to 
contradict the scenario of political disintegration: "Surprisingly, in the light of 
current retrospectives on the 'era of stagnation', the Soviet economy moved 
steadily forward throughout the 1960s and on into the 1970s."
67 
In other words, it was not obvious what these contradictory findings implied 
about the dynamics of the system as a whole - a predicament which produced 
equally contradictory speculations about the future of Soviet socialism. Hough 
expected to be able to make a decision between these scenarios on the basis of a 
general theory of social change: "As the need for developmental categories and 
theories became clear, the scholars whose work seemed most relevant and proved 
most influential were the great sociologists, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons."
68 
This recourse to sociological modernization theory, however, was accompanied by 
a functionalist interpretation of Soviet development against which the recent 
attack on "social science revisionism" is directed. In his evolution-theoretical 
synthesis of the available research, Talcott Parsons conceded that the "Soviet 
regime despite its prevailing dictatorial character has also introduced features of 
the democratic revolution" - although without genuine possibilities to elect 
between competing groups, without a legitimately organized opposition and 
without well-defined civil rights vis-a-vis the state.
69 Accordingly, irreversible 
processes of social change put the political system under stress. Imbalances 
between a relatively successful industrial and social modernization and a lack of 
legitimized party leadership appeared to indicate that the ,,welfare-state-authorita-
rianism" would have to progress towards political democracy. The internal 
renunciation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the foreign-policy formula 
of "peaceful coexistence" were interpreted as a pragmatic adaptation of an Utopian 
ideology to the imperatives of modern industrial societies, and as the capability of 
the political institutions to develop along lines which Hough extrapolated as 
follows: "If one sees evolution in the system in the last ten to fifteen years, one is 
more likely to see the possibility of evolution in the future."
70 
67  Daniels 1993, 61. Or as the latest World Development Report of the World Bank, hardly     
      suspicious of sympathizing with socialist economies, admits: "The achievments of the planned   
      system were considerable. They included increased output, industrialization, the provision of  
      basic  education,  health  care,  housing,  and jobs to entire populations (...). Incomes were   
      relatively equally distributed, and an extensive, if inefficient welfare state ensured everyone   
      access to basic goods and services" (World Bank 1996, 1). 
68   Hough 1977, 224, or Hough & Fainsod 1979, 566. 
Parsons 1971, ch. 7, here 158, mainly relying on the research by Berliner, Bauer, Fainsod, 
Grossmann, Inkeles, Moore and Rostow. 
70   Hough 1977, ix. 
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Perestroika seemed to realize this evolutionary potential while it tried to convert 
the pent-up democratization pressure into institutional reforms and political 
mobilization "from below". Gorbachev was considered a "transformational 
leader" having recognized in full clarity "that a complicated urban society at some 
point stops responding to the urges of backward political institutions."
71 This was 
taken into account by renewing the functionary body and reorganizing the 
Politburo, by recognizing basic human rights, and finally by institutional 
innovations and surrendering the CPSU's monopoly of power.
72 Social groups 
who could expect a good starting point for themselves in the reformed system 
were identified as a political basis for the democratic opening: young 
professionals, specialized workers who had risen to the middle class, highly-
qualified women and national elites looking forward to more autonomy.
73 
Gorbachev's genuine reform intentions were most clearly shown by the suggested 
federalization of the Union Treaty and the surrender of the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
"Never before in history had a great power retreated so precipitiously from its 
sphere of dominion without having been crushed in a war."
74 Nothing, it 
appeared, could stop the East European countries' return to cultural and national 
diversity. 
With the largely non-violent resignation of the communist party, that had been 
once considered all powerful, and the non-occurence of a military intervention 
(which had been predicted so often), long-lasting controversies in communist 
studies seemed to be definitively decided in favour of the modernization 
approach. From this perspective, the failure to foresee the Soviet breakdown 
could be attributed to persistent stereotypes of totalitarianism theory, which had 
trickled down into journalism. From this point of view, the 1989 revolutions have 
shown "how undifferentiated the theories of totalitarianism had once described a 
monolithic system to us (...). Totalitarian leaders and theorists of totalitarianism 
had one thing in common: They believed in the effectiveness of the security 
apparatus."
75 
(b) Nevertheless, it is this point, that the strongest argument against the 
modernization approach emerges - with an objection which explains the new 
interest in totalitarianism theory. The failure of the last Soviet reform attempts, 
the dwindling of the Communist Party and the course of the post-communist 
transformations have disappointed the evolutionary optimism from Parsons to 
Hough in several ways. Gorbachev's policy, instead of leading to the proclaimed 
perestroika "from below", initiated an unintended collapse. Disillusioned hopes 
for socialist reforms precipitated the "death of the third way".
76 The nationalist 
71  Lewin 1988, 130. Cf. also Lane 1992, 3-5 and 382-86. 
72  Cf. Breslauer 1989, and Brown 1990, esp. 151-53, and now Brown 1996, ch. 6. 
73  Cf. Ruble 1987. 
74  Daniels 1993, 120. 
75  v. Beyme 1994, 32. 
76  Lipset l990. 
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touch of post-communist policy and the glorification of an imaginary past reveals 
how thin the layers of a civil society in Eastern Europe conjured by dissidents and 
Western observers actually were - some observers even speak of a case of 
"civilizational incompetence".
77 
The economic collapse and the political apathy in post-communism prove how 
much Western research, however careful with its prognoses, had over-estimated 
the rationality of Soviet-type societies - contrary to all the warnings formulated by 
one of the most well-known Soviet dissidents, Andrej Amalrik, against illusions 
about the limits of reform.
78 The failure of perestroika is now understood as a 
validation of Amalrik's sarcastic prediction that the Communist leadership may be 
ready to import Western fashion - willing to accept a "socialism with uncovered 
knees" - but not a socialism with a human face. The unreformability of East 
European societies, proved post factum, is being traced back to the sustained 
validity of central variables of totalitarianism theory.
79 
The arguments for reconsidering totalitarianism theory are, nevertheless, of 
differing quality. While historians like Furet and Malia blame the "logic of 
Leninism" for the disastrous outcome of East European history and blame the 
"social science approach"
80 for the reform illusions of Sovietology, political 
scientists like William Odom advocate a more differentiated critique of specific 
hypotheses in communist studies. These authors have in common that they 
hypothesize a basic structure of Soviet ideology and politics which was left 
untouched by de-Stalinization and against which, therefore, perestroika had to 
fail. According to the neo-totalitarian critique, Gorbachev's initiatives, 
unknowingly, violated the principles of the system. This was not so much due to 
its erratic character - which could be explained on the one hand from learning 
processes, on the other hand from tactical manoeuvres to neutralize or even 
include conservative forces into a strategy of transition to democracy.
81 Their 
failure was much more systemic. 
Firstly, it was due to the incompatibility of party rule and democracy. Attempts to 
bring dynamics into the party by massive renewals of personnel on all levels and 
to broaden the basis of reform policy by co-optation of critics, intellectuals and 
social scientists into a "socialist pluralism" of a "socialist system of checks and 
balances", failed due to the inertia of the apparatus. All measures of 
decentralization were not sufficient to counterbalance the enduring power 
77  Sztompka 1993. 
78  Amalrik 1969, 33-34. 
79  See esp. Odom 1992, esp. 81-88; cf. the authors mentioned below in fn. 114. 
"With a fair admixture of Marxism (...); indeed, this Sovietology to a degree reflected Soviet 
thinking in the Moscow social science institutes of the Academy of Sciences" (Malia 1990, 
299). 
81   Cf. Breslauer 1989, esp. 171-177. For the following see Brown 1989. 
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monopoly of a party, which determined the occupation of leading functions in all 
political and societal institutions. Obviously the nature of this closely-tied 
network, instead of leading to democratic opening, would make every approach to 
liberalization lead to ist dissolution.
82 Gorbachev himself must have eventually 
recognized this and tried to outflank the Central Committee's Secretariat and the 
Politburo by upgrading the local Soviets and the Supreme Soviet to quasi-
parliamentary organs, as well as creating a presidential office. 
Secondly, the rigidity of the economic system did not seem to allow for the 
combination of plan and market introduced gradually by increasing 
enterpreneurial autonomy and licensing private co-operatives without 
simultaneously introducing free prices and private ownership. Under these 
circumstances, the reforms contributed to the dismantling of the vertical line of 
command and supply from the planning authorities to the enterprises without 
establishing new horizontal ties. Instead of modernizing the economy, this led to 
the final crisis of the system - as certified by the CIA: "The country went from 
stagnation to decline."
83 The informal economy, which seemed most likely to be 
able to activate entrepreneurial initiative, was parasitically embedded in the 
defective planning system. Its legalization did not create free enterprise, but a 
booty capitalism in which privatization in favour of the old nomenclatura played a 
major role. 
Thirdly, the federalization offered to the republics did not stimulate the expected 
local reforms within a multi-national democratic state. Instead, this was seen as an 
invitation to political movements striving for national independence, into which 
the Communist Parties of numerous republics quickly transformed themselves, 
thinking not so much of democracy but of maintaining their power at any price. 
On the one hand, the "ethnification" of the disputes with the central government, 
the retention of revenues and the decline of inter-republican economic relations to 
barter, have condemned to failure the last attempt to stabilize the soviet state's 
economic foundation. On the other hand, the unity of the "Soviet people" has 
proved to be a myth. The collapse of the Soviet Union was considered an 
unavoidable price of its democratization.
84 
Neither the dismissal of Marxism-Leninism accompanying Gorbachev's "new 
thinking" nor the pluralization of science and the opening of mass media could 
secure a social basis for the politics of reform beyond the perestroika 
intelligence.
85 The critical historical examination of Stalinism, fainthearted in the 
beginning, eventually destroyed the credibility of the entire Soviet system as the 
82   Malia 1992, 60. 
CIA 1991, 328; or as Goldman 1991, 142, generously concedes: "Gorbachev achieved one 
thing: the gradual dismantling of the planned and administrative economic system." 
84  Suny, 1990, 363. 
85  Cf. Connor 1996, pp. 6-9. 
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disclosure of the extent of terror increased. Even though perestroika was 
introduced as a return to the principles of Leninism, the causes of Stalinism were 
no longer seen only as "deformations", but traced back to the unscrupulous 
relation of Bolshevism to power. Characteristically, the blank spots of history 
were not primarily discussed by professional historians who were still inside the 
academic hierarchy.
86 The commitment from writers, journalists, and readers' 
letters indicated a high degree of public politicization - and, at the same time, the 
polarization within Soviet society. A defence line was drawn against Western-
oriented intellectuals by a front of orthodox communists and Slavophile writers, 
who saw the achievements of the "history of the fatherland" brought into discredit 
by information on pollution, criminality, drug use, and corruption, all of which 
became accessible in the course of glasnost. 
The economic downfall, the territorial disintegration of the Union, as well as the 
loss of intellectual orientation, manifests a depressing outcome of the last 
attempts at reform. "Six years of perestroika produced fairly rapid 'political decay' 
in the party but failed to achieve effective 'political development' of new political 
institutions."
87 If this outcome can neither be explained by insufficient willingness 
for reforms nor by tactical clumsiness of the leadership
88, then this appears to 
validate the structural insights of totalitarianism theory. Due to the over-
integration of ideology, politics, and economy, every partial reform which was to 
have any effect at all necessarily had to affect the entire system and 
simultaneously provoke opposition on a broad front. Unlike Khrushchev, 
Gorbachev met considerable resistance from the grass roots, so that perestroika, 
against all its intentions, remained a policy "from above". 
Up until the breakdown of the Soviet Union it became clear to which extent the 
Communist Party and its ideology remained the omnipotent decision-making 
actor above the society it ruled. The parties that entered the first elections were 
only short-lived fission-products, election clubs of former functionaries, or 
tactical alliances. The initial stages of civil society were limited to intellectual 
circles. Without a real basis in social movements, they could not build up an 
independent power against the perseverance of the old elite. The limited 
mobilization of the people, on the one side, has been ascribed to the culturally 
deep-rooted egalitarianism mainly of the state-dependent workers
89 who in the 
case of doubt prefer uniformity in poverty to freedom under risk, and represent the 
basis of the reformed and still influential communist parties. On the other hand, 
quite a few 
86  Cf. Lewin 1995, 300-303. 
87  Odom 1992, 84. 
88   According to Breslauer 1989, Ill-Ill, Gorbachev followed all the maxims of the Transition to  
     Democracy literature; cf. Hough 1990, Remington 1990 and Bova 1991. On the other hand, one  
     might argue that Gorbachev took Huntingtons recommendation (1965, 414) too seriously,   
     according to which a strong party may be of general interest because it alone can guarantee a   
     stable frame for transformation. 
89   Zaslavsky 1995. 
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opposition groups, having lost their common enemy, were drowned in the waves 
of national movements. According to Malia, only one thing remained: "economic 
and social rubble - hardly the foundation to build a 'normal' society".
90 
Can the theory of neo-totalitarianism thus rightly claim deeper insight into the 
non-reformability of socialist societies as well as into the painful course of the 
post-communist crises? 
5. Defects of Neo-Totalitarianism Theory 
The strength of the renewed theory of totalitarianism no doubt lies in its polemics 
against the evolutionist synthesis of Soviet studies: to expect a convergence of the 
Eastern to the Western model of industrial modernization proved to be just as 
wrong as the hopes for a non-capitalist way to modernity. Quite plausibly, the end 
of Sovietology was explained by its fatal relation to the evolutionary optimism of 
orthodox modernization theory that had already been negated by the crises of 
Western societies.
91 Malia's gloomy anticipation of the difficult reconstruction of 
"post-totalitarian" societies was thus simultaneously a challenge to those 
sociologists who believed that the collapse of the Soviet system was no more than 
"catching-up modernization".
92 
In contrast to functional theories which claim a positive correlation between 
industrialization and democratization, the incontestable merit of neo-
totalitarianism theory consists of emphasizing the independent weight and the 
specific irrationality of domination. Power restructuring processes were and are 
constituting elements of Russian and Soviet history.
93 The main intention of neo-
totalitarianists aims at proving the continuity of a form of domination across 
drastic processes of social change - even if certain characteristics of the classical 
definition of totalitarianism have to be given up. Their normative appeal is 
supported by the internal perspective of Eastern European dissidents who had an 
immediate experience of the limits of system-immanent reform attempts. 
90   Malia 1990, 334; cf. Malia 1992, 69. 
91   "Just when sociologists thought they had buried modernization theory, Sovietology resurrects 
       its crudest form - development through stages held back by cultural lag", as Burawoy 1992 
      782, writes.  ' 
92    On this diagnosis see Mueller 1991 and 1992. 
93  Lupher 1996 shows from the point of view of Weber's sociology of domination, the   
      comparative and historical approaches of Theda Skopcol and Mangabiera Unger, as well as  
      Michael  Mann's  theory  of  power.  He  simultaneously corrects the thoughtless transfer of   
      Western categories and the stylizations of the theory of totalitarianism. 
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But is the "update" of the concept of totalitarianism
94 offered by the critics of the 
social science approach also a theoretical alternative? This question, which 
articulates the common interest of sociological theory and post-communist 
studies, can be discussed on the basis of two criteria which lead beyond the 
fruitless polemics between "social science approach" and "historical logic": along 
the methodological status of historical prognoses and the comparative question 
which William Odom appropriately asks: "At issue is what each emphasizes, 
uncovers, and encourages us to anticipate about systems dynamics."
95 
(a) Concerning the retrospective attempts to explain the implosion of the socialist 
system, the pure reproach of failed prognosis misses the methodological problems 
of analysis in social science. The neo-totalitarianist approach reduces the 
explanandum to an incident of collapse which was inscribed in the fatal logic of 
an essentially unreformable and intrinsically unchangeable socialism. Seventyfour 
years of Soviet history are stylized into a self-fulfilling teleology. Obviously, this 
"retrospective determinism"
96 cannot comply with the methodology of 
explanation in social science and historiography. The question is not to present 
isolated events; the point of interest is their explanation in terms of the socio-
economic dynamics and the political constellations from which they emerged. 
Every single factor of breakdown, when examined on its own, had been known 
for some time: the economy's innovation weakness; the costs of the domestic and 
external empire and military over-expansion; the undermining of the centralized 
system by an underground economy and networks of patronage; the loss of 
position in a globalized, hi-tech world economy; the erosion of ideological faith 
even within the leadership, along with corruption, etc. The question left 
unanswered was the interplay of these factors of crisis that had been visible at 
least since the 1970s. In particular, it was uncertain whether the political 
leadership, among whom the understanding of the dramatic situation began to 
prevail in the 1980s, would come to terms on a reform of the entire system. 
In other words, the complex causality of the Soviet downfall consisted of a 
"cluster" of necessary conditions of crisis, which were insufficient when taken on 
their own. The dynamics resulting from their interaction, previous wrong 
decisions, changing political coalitions and from the unintended effects of 
Gorbachev's liberalizations were inherently accident-prone: "a protracted, 
complex, and unpredictable process."
97 The Soviet development neither followed 
94   Malia 1990, 301. 
95   Odom 1992, 67. 
93    As Di Palma, Guiseppe 1990 critically characterized this position. Bendix 1964, 13, spoke of a  
      "fallacy of retrospective determinism". 
94  Colton 1987, 169; cf. the methodically careful retrospective sketches by Dallin 1992, Suny  
     1993, 159-160, and Deudney & Ikenberry 1991. "The chance that something 'unexpected' will    
     take place is fairly significant", Hough already wrote earlier (in Hough & Fainsod 1979, 570),  
     expecting that a new leadership would be combined with far-reaching liberalization - whereas a 
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an evolutionary logic of successful reforms nor the fatal teleology of a necessary 
breakdown. The fact that these dynamics could hardly be forecast was much more 
due to a structure of domination which was indeed familiar to Soviet research. 
Due to the hierarchical decision-making structure, radical impulses for reform 
could only be initiated by the supreme leadership.
98 Beneath the party unity" 
which until the very end was ritually conjured by the conservative members of the 
Politburo, anarchy, as Rostow had already elaborated, was lurking
100: Lacking 
explicit rules and constitutionally defined decision-making procedures, each 
serious dissent at the superior level had to give rise to incalculable power 
struggles - which characterize post-Soviet politics beyond the end of the Soviet 
Union to the present day. 
If no definite prognosis was to be expected considering the complexity of Soviet 
tendencies of crises and the fragility of reform politics, then the methodological 
task of a retrospective analysis at least consists in constructing a historical 
understanding of the situation, within which structural constraints and decision-
making situations, scopes for action and strategies, as well as wrong decisions and 
unintended effects should play a considerable role. The charge of failed prognosis 
addressed to Soviet studies is shifted to the substantial question of what the neo-
totalitarianist historians might contribute towards such an understanding of the 
situation over and above the modernization approaches. 
(b) Related to this question, neo-totalitarianism theory is by no means 
homogeneous. On the contrary, wherever it seems necessary, its authors fall back 
upon the results of the modernization approach and cover these results with value 
judgements instead of building a dynamic theory of their own. 
In his reflections on immobilism and the possible decay of the Soviet Union 
written in 1966 and still quoted today, Robert Conquest classified the population 
and its differentiated interests into sociological categories. He discovered that 
peasants were alienated from the system, that workers articulated their dissent by 
striking, and the academic intelligentsia dodged the ordained orthodoxy. 
Conquest's diagnosis rested entirely on assumptions of modernization theory: The 
more complex economy and a differentiated society give rise to demands which 
overload the capacity of the political institutions. Quite contrary to the 
assumptions of classic totalitarianism theory, the assumed final crisis of the 
Soviet system was derived from the weakness of the political institutions, from 
the fact that it no longer tolerated a leader who could enforce the necessary 
radical reforms 
      democratization of the Soviet Union, as Hough extrapolated, would question the persistence of        
      the Warsaw Pact, the Comecon and the Union's existing form. 
98  Kerblay 1883, 258 and 265. 
99  Steele 1994, 83-100, impressively describes the helplessness of the last conjurations of unity at 
the 19th party conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in June 1988. 
100  Rostow 1953, 197. Cf. Dahrendorf, 1958. 
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with Stalin-like power against the bureaucracy's inertia. Conquest's assumption of 
a possibly sudden or even catastrophic change left room for a scenario of 
evolution of the political system which was in no way inferior to Parsons' or 
Houghs' extrapolations and thus expecting "the gradual acceptance by the 
leadership - however reluctantly given - of genuine elections within the party 
and/or the gradual transformation of the perfectly adequate constitutional form of 
the Soviet state into reality."
101 
The sharp contrast between Conquest and his fellow historians to the "positivist" 
Sovietology consists of the postulate to shift the analytical focus from the 
mechanisms of political institutions, the structure of social practices and 
processes of social change to terror as the "true nature" of Soviet history. This 
focus on terror should be combined with an explicitly moral and political 
judgement which condemns Soviet modernization as an extreme "deviation" from 
"normal history".
102 Leaving aside the heroic pretension of having discerned the 
"normal" course of history, such a polarization seems to be more likely speaking 
the language of Russian exceptionalism than to enable theoretical insights into the 
dynamics of Soviet reforms. 
On the contrary, studying Richard Pipes' explicitly normative functionalization of 
the concept of totalitarianism reveals to what extent it had to misinterpret the 
change of Soviet politics which set in with Gorbachev. Pipes ascribed the 
singularity of Russian totalitarianism not so much to Marxism but to peculiar 
conditions difficult to understand for Western-minded scientists: to the aggressive 
basic attitude of a state which has been urging territorial expansion for several 
centuries; to the fact that the autocratic organisation of domination has never been 
relativized by feudal structures or counterbalanced by a bourgeoisie; to the 
absence of traditions of property rights; to a peasant population kept in bondage 
with no rights, and to the inertia of a "political culture" deeply moulded by these 
peculiarities. 
Further deviating from the classic concept of totalitarianism, Pipes ascribes only a 
secondary role to the idea of socialism in the formulation of Soviet policy. While 
it was quite capable of socially extending democracy in the context of a Western 
culture of political freedom and private ownership, the idea of socialism in Russia 
was brought into line with the all too powerful imperial tradition: "The 
explanation for Soviet totalitarianism must be sought not in socialism but in the 
political culture which draws on socialist ideas to justify totalitarian practices."
103 
The imperviousness of the Bolshevik regime is thus based on the actualization of 
101  Conquest 1966, 71. 
102  Conquest 1993, 93. 
103  Pipes 1984, 21. Consequently, "Russian totalitarianism" would by no means have fallen apart 
with the end of the Soviet Union, but live on in Russian exceptionalism and imperial ambitions 
conrning the "near abroad". 
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autocratic expansionism in the name of a world revolution which followed no 
other law than the 300-year impetus for conquest - a combination, which made 
any hope for evolution or modernization futile: "Here no sociological or other 
'scientific' theories are of much help."
104 The normative message, which Pipes 
substitutes for social science analysis, consisted of the warning that the Soviet 
Union was by nature aggressive: "by definition incapable of evolution from 
within and impervious to change from without"
105 - a message which was to be 
understood during the time when he was an adviser for the Reagan administration 
as a political statement in the strict sense.
106 
Whilst Pipes degrades Marxism to an extrinsic ideology of legitimization, Martin 
Malta  tries to deduce the entire Soviet history from the "logic" of Leninism. 
Accordingly, the totalitarian intention
107 of integral revolutionary socialism aimed 
at abolishing private property, market and profit. Its realization was not so much 
characterized by an effective domination of society and the extent of open terror, 
but by the institutional subordination of politics, economy and culture under a 
party-state which legitimated itself as the agent of historical progress. Therefore, 
the primacy of power over economic development processes, established by 
Lenin, already received its basic institutional form during War Communism: the 
party's leading role, the parallel structure of administration and political control, 
as well as the central planning system. All initiatives of "soft communism", from 
the New Economic Policy of the 1920s to Perestroika, stood no chance against the 
cast-iron logic of this institutional ensemble. In this sense, Soviet history did not 
follow the path of "modernization", but unfurled its basic institutional structure. 
Hence, there were no internal alternatives.
108 Attempts of reform aimed at the 
continuation of the Utopian project under critical conditions. 
In trying to explain the realization of the totalitarian "logic" of domination, as 
well as the development phases of the Soviet model and its final crisis, Malia also 
104  Pipes 1984, 24. 
105  Pipes 1984b, 49. In a similar alarmist sense, Conquest (1986, Epilogue) supposed, as a topical 
implication of his history of Stalinist terror, that the present leaders of the system mostly 
unchanged since 1934, could also be prepared to take part in a war with millions of victims. 
106  In the early 1980s, Pipes had considerable influence on the formulation of armament policy of 
the United States. As a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, Pipes was appointed 
by Reagan (himself a member) as specialist on Soviet and East European affairs on the 
National Security Council. From 1981 to 1983 he advocated not only the containment but the 
roll back of communism by economical and ideological warfare. After being replaced by the 
more pragmatic Jack Matlock, Pipes, along with several anti-Soviet members of the first 
Reagan administration, joined the Committee for the Free World, which was strongly opposed 
to the first meeting of Gorbachev and Reagan and to any talks with the Soviets at all. See 
Garthoff 1994, 11-14, 104-105 and 249: cf. Talbott 1984, 222-223. 
107  Malia 1990, 300-301. An intentionalist and mitigated concept of totalitarianism is now also 
being advocated by Connor 1996, 5-6: "(...) not, to be sure, in the sense of full and active 
conformity to the Friedrich-Brzezinski six point-model any longer". 
108  As Malia maintains against Arendt, who regarded the continuation of the New Economic 
Policy as a "clear alternative" to Stalin's seizure of power and the installation of a system of 
total rule (Arendt 1966, 484, fn. 15). 
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freely refers to the entire spectrum of the incriminated liberalist Soviet research: 
the economic diagnosis that the economic model of extensive growth has reached 
its internal and external limits, as well as the sociological analysis of a social 
structure which has fundamentally changed and which excluded the revival of the 
ancient regime even with authoritarian measures. But how was it possible to 
break up the iron cage of the totalitarian institutions? Symptomatically, Malia can 
only answer this question, which is so decisive for his approach, by referring to an 
arch-"revisionist" thesis: ,,The country was swept with a wave of self-
organisation from below; popular fronts and embryonic trade union associations 
appeared in the cities of Russia and the Ukraine. Thus 'civil society', as the 
opposition called these new formations, began to emerge for the first time since it 
has been suppressed in 1918."
109 
6. Conclusion 
If my assessment is correct, the neo-totalitarian explanations of the Soviet 
breakdown are neither coherent nor can they offer a well-founded theory of the 
social organisation of domination. It is true that some of the modernization theory 
"revisionists" have shared the reform optimism of Soviet Perestroika-Sociology, 
which had broken up the monolithic image of a "totalitarian" Soviet society. 
However, there are no signs that Pipes' perspective, based on the "state school" of 
Russian historiography, or Malia's and Furet's ideographic approach, are 
permitting deeper insights into the dynamics of Soviet socialism. 
If the retrospective attempts to explain the socialist breakdown are evaluated by 
their insights into the long-term dynamics of East European societies, then none 
of them would have been able to "foresee" the time and course of the change in 
Soviet politics which began in the mid-1980s.
110 Why did the "house of cards" not 
fall apart already in 1941 under the Nazi-attack, in 1953 with Stalin's death, in 
1956 with the onset of the Thaw and the Polish and Hungarian upheavals, in 1968 
under the impression of the Prague Spring or 1983 after Breshnev's death? How 
were reform groups and politicians like Gorbachev able to rise inside the 
Communist Party and finally prepared to dismantle the whole system?
111 How 
was it possible that a reform intelligentsia - also in social science - emerged in 
official institutions within the 'most total totalitarianism', which "reprogrammed 
the software in a myriad of little decisions, right until the hardware's final 
spectacular 
109  Malia 1990, 328. 
110  Heller & Nekrich 1981, for instance, emphasized the system's stability and its "successes of 
foreign policy throughout the world" in the final remarks of their totalitarian-theoretical history 
of the Soviet Union. 
111  As Daniels (1993, 58) asks - a question which obviously even astonished Malia (1994, 
Epilogue). 
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implosion in 1991?" 
112 Why did the perestroika-reforms break out in the Russian 
centre and not in the periphery - where they contrarily met resistance?
113 How 
would Pipes want to interpret Gorbachev's initiatives for disarmament or the 
peaceful abandonment of the Central East European empire? 
The downfall of the Soviet Union, easily ascertained post mortem, leaves us with 
a number of open questions revealing the shortcomings of the neo-totalitarian 
approaches as social science theory. The action theoretical defects of their 
historico-philosophical teleology of failure are complementary to the justly 
criticized logic of progress articulated by orthodox modernization theory. The, as 
it is, negative action theory of the neo-totalitarians corresponded to the experience 
of powerlessness of East European dissidents. It conjured the futility of system-
immanent changes in Soviet-type societies - and thereby was not able to perceive 
the actors of systemic change anymore. The change in interests, the political 
strategies and ideological re-orientations which led to the dissolution of Soviet 
society by a series of changing coalitions and non-intended consequences of 
action were not systematically analysed, but integrated ad hoc into the neo-
totalitarian approach.
114 
Thus, it is no surprise that Malia does not even try to present his neo-totalitarian 
approach as a contribution to scientific research but as a reinterpretation of 
concepts already known. The conceptual approach he is referring to is not the 
classical totalitarianism theory but Alexander Gerschenkron's hypothesis on 
economic backwardness in Russia complemented by some sociological theorems 
on partial and imbalanced modernization, well-known through the work of 
Bendix, Moore, Eisenstadt, Rueschemeyer and Huntington.
115 Moreover, relying 
heavily on the results of "revisionist" research, Malia admits that the socio-
historical "revisionism" earned some merits in revealing the interaction between 
state and society even during hard-core Stalinism.
116 In a similar way, Bence and 
112  As Strobe Talbott writes in his Preface to Arbatov 1992, a very informative internal history of 
the emergence of the later Perestroika-intelligentsia. 
113  Namely in the GDR, in Bulgaria, Romania and the CSSR, in contrast to Hungary and Poland. 
114  Comisso 1991, 88-89, argues in a similar ad hoc way. Her "'new' totalitarianism theory" tries to 
integrate the changes in social structure and the sphere of values, and the co-optation policy of 
the Communist Party, etc. as demonstrated by the modernization theorists in Soviet research. 
"Totalitarianism", however, is thereby reduced to the leadership's ideologically motivated 
refusal to face the political implications of these changes. Karklins 1994, here 31, even goes so 
far as to explain the Soviet downfall by Gorbachev's mistake: "like many Westerners, he did 
not 
see the Soviet system as totalitarian and therefore dichotomous to other systems". If so, it 
would be necessary to explain why Gorbachev's conservative enemies could not stop him and 
make him face totalitarianism, but how he was able to force the entire system to collapse. Both 
authors presupposed an erosion of "totalitarian rule" without being able to seize it with the 
methods  of totalitarianism theory;  at most,  both  confirm  the  complementary  error  of 
totalitarianism theory and the communist leadership which was identified by v.Beyme 1994 
(see above, fn. 75): to believe in the apparatus' effectiveness. 
115  Cf. Gerschenkron 1952, Eisenstadt 1964, Huntington 1965, and Rueschemeyer 1976. 
116  Malia 1994, ch. 7, where Malia refers to the research of Sheila Fitzpatrik. 
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Lipset conclude their critique of Sovietology with the perspective which Jerry 
Hough already introduced 15 years ago: returning to Weber and Parsons.
117 
Therefore, the mediation between the totalitarianism model and social science 
approaches which Odom suggests, could be agreed to at least in so far as it 
reaches beyond the anti-sociological prejudice of his historiographic colleagues 
and recommends a return of post-communist studies to the mainstream of 
comparative social science: „(...) the old totalitarian model could have been richly 
supplemented by numerous 'theories of middle range'. (...) we could have kept 
much of the macro model's perspective and at the same time explained the 
microbehaviour more precisely, either as being consistent with it or slowly 
eroding its applicability."
118 This is the path which the research on Eastern Europe 
after 1989 has actually taken. Post-communist studies have seen an explosive 
growth of the "social science approach" in the course of which many "revisionist" 
theorems have been refuted, modified or confirmed. Continuities in research on 
old topics like elite circulation, networking, political culture, national traditions, 
regional fragmentation, etc. have not underlined the impression of a "totalitarian 
society", but exposed "a crisis of a state without a political system (...): a power 
over the fate of many people, but actual powerless in regard to the process in 
general."
119 New approaches, theories of rational choice, institution-building, 
transitions to democracy etc., have been integrated into the field. The 
overestimated growth rates of Soviet-type economies have been recalculated, the 
causes of their decay were layed open. Even the CIA has been vindicated for its 
supposedly failed prognoses.
120 
Nevertheless, the wave of social science theories entering the East European 
studies does not imply a way back to the golden age of classic modernization 
theory. The lesson to be learned from (neo-)totalitarianism theory concerns the 
stress it lays on domination and its specific irrationalities, variables which were 
indeed neglected by mainstream sociology and, after the Soviet breakdown, are 
ignored by liberalist optimism of neoclassic reform programmes.
121 The drama of 
the post-communist crises reminds us that there are no hidden hands and no 
evolutionary universals which would lead, quasi automatically, to "modernity". 
On the other hand, the lesson to be learned from the "social science approach" is 
that even the "most total totalitarianism" did not result from a "logic" of history, 
but from certain constellations of interests, reciprocities between rulers and ruled, 
institutions of administration and value commitments, etc. which are quite 
accessible to a reconstruction in sociological terms. 
117  Bence& Lipset 1994. 
118  Odom 1992, 81. 
119  Lewin 1995, 297 and 121.. 
120  Berkowitz & Richelson 1995. 
121  See Mueller 1995, 274-285. 
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